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POLITICAL MYTHOLOGIES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY IN 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF HERMANN HELLER, ERNST CASSIRER, 
AND KARL LÖWITH 
 
 
 
Beginning in the late 19th century, politics became a particularly 
problematic topic of philosophical inquiry in Europe. The problematic 
character of politics continued to deepen with the radicalization of political 
tendencies in Germany and in Europe during 1920s and 1930s, and it has 
not ceased to haunt philosophical inquiry, even beyond the reorientation of 
Europe following World War II. 
The problematic status of politics after the late 19th century became 
particularly evident in Germany. In late 19th century Germany the 
ideological implications of this problem took on a particularly radical form, 
leading to the catastrophic consequences of Nazi rule in the ensuing 
decades. The “problem” raised in this context for philosophical reflection is 
that of politics stripped of all traditional ideals and conceived as a function 
of the sheer power of the State. Let us examine more closely the 
implications for political philosophy of this concept of State power, of the 
Machtstaat, unburdened by traditional constraints or by ethical norms or 
other universal claims posited by philosophy since its origins in Antiquity. 
As a means of undertaking this examination, I will investigate a crucial 
issue which arose in the early decades of this century: the precise 
implications of the radicalization of the notion of the Machtstaat for the 
concept of the political as such. My analysis branches out in two directions. 
I first examine the three main attempts to theoretically comprehend this 
radicalization and the emergence of fascism. These three divergent 
approaches were developed by the philosopher of law Hermann Heller, and 
by the philosophers Ernst Cassirer and Karl Löwith. Discussion of these 
three approaches will provide the conceptual groundwork needed for a more 
general theoretical inquiry, which is the subject of the second part of this 
paper. In this part I will succinctly examine the problem of twentieth 
century politics in relation to one of its primary features: the fictionalization 
of the political. 
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I. Fiction, Myth, Ideology: Hermann Heller, Ernst Cassirer, Karl 
Löwith 
Hermann Heller, Ernst Cassirer, Karl Löwith: three authors who shared 
the same determination to challenge the ideological underpinnings of the 
Machtstaat as formulated by the apologists of fascism.1 Well before they 
were forced to emigrate, each of these authors proposed a critique of 
fascism: Heller's philosophy of law – the theoretical backbone of social 
democracy in the Weimar Republic – Ernst Cassirer's neo-Kantian 
liberalism, and the political orientation of Karl Löwith, whose skepticism 
as regards any system makes him difficult to classify in the traditional 
categories. Each of these thinkers produced a different (even divergent) 
approach to the radicalization of the politics of the Machstaat, conceived as 
both a mystification specific to the twentieth century and as an outgrowth 
of tendencies deeply rooted in the European political tradition. The primary 
reason for selecting these three approaches, justifying their examination in 
common for purposes of broader theorization, lies in the critique each 
formulated of the instrumentalization of politics as means of legitimating 
the Machtstaat. Each of these philosophers considered that such 
instrumentalization, while deeply rooted in a long Western tradition, 
reflects strategies of legitimization and manipulation which, given their 
extremism, accounts for the unprecedented nature of fascism (above all of 
nazism) in Europe, when compared with earlier political traditions. It is 
the unprecedented nature of this radicalization of the Machtstaat which 
each of these authors considered to deliberately break with earlier 
assumptions concerning the existence of an autonomous political “reality” 
capable of imposing limitations on the quest for total power. This is what 
Hermann Heller analyzes in terms of the “fictionalization of politics”; what 
Cassirer views in terms of “political myths of the twentieth century” and 
what Löwith conceives under the heading of the “ideology of facticity”. A 
brief overview of these three concepts will lead to examination of the key 
issue concerning what I take to be the “problem” of politics in the 20th 
century. 
 
 
                                            
1
 The preliminaries to this inquiry can be found in an article on the political 
philosophy of Karl Löwith, entitled “The Sense of History: on the Political 
Implications of Karl Löwith's Interpretation of Secularization”, in History and 
Theory, n. 1, vol. 37, 1998 , p.69-82) and in two unpublished articles devoted to 
Hermann Heller (“Hermann Heller and the Juridical-political criticism of 
fascism in the context of the Weimar Republic”) and Ernst Cassirer (“The 
Theory of myth in Ernst Cassirer: the ethico-political stakes of the debate 
between Cassirer and Martin Heidegger” to appear in Ernst Cassirer: Symbol, 
Science and Culture.)  
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Hermann Heller and the idea of “fictionalization of politics” 
Despite the recent reprinting by J.C.B. Mohr Publishers in Tübingen of 
Heller's complete works, which were out of print for many years, many of 
the writings of this philosopher of law are still hardly known. 
Notwithstanding Heller's profound influence on German legal theory and 
legal philosophy at the time of the Weimar Republic, these works have 
never been translated into English or into French. As a major theoretician 
of social-democracy in Germany at the time of the Weimar Republic, 
Hermann Heller was also one of the most eminent jurists of his time. He 
served as the legal representative of the social-democratic government of 
Prussia during the so-called Preussenschlag of 1932 when the Prussian 
provincial government challenged the decision of the German President, von 
Hindenburg, to resort to emergency decree as a means of replacing elected 
social democrats by representatives loyal to Hugenburg and to Hitler. 
Heller's direct adversary in this trial before the Constitutional Court of 
Germany was none other than Carl Schmitt who subsequently, over a 
period of several years, served as architect of the Nazi legal system.2 
To analyze Heller’s notion of the fictionalization of politics, I will briefly 
refer to three of his works: Hegel und der nationale Machtstaatsgedanke in 
Deutschland (Hegel and the Idea of the Power State in Germany), published 
in 1921; Europa und der Faschismus (Europe and Fascism), initially 
published in 1929, and then reissued in an expanded edition in 1931; and 
Die Souveränität (Sovereignty) published in 1927. The first of these books 
discusses the “instrumentalization of politics” promoted by the notion of 
the Machtstaat. In Hegel und der nationale Machtstaatsgedanke in 
Deutschland, Heller described the extension and warping of Hegel’s 
philosophy of the State that led to the formulation of the power state 
ideology, as expressed at the end of the 19th century in the famous 
statement by Heinrich von Treitschke, the official historiographer of 
Germany from its creation in 1871. According to Treitschke, the essence of 
the State is “power, power and power once again” (Macht, Macht, und 
wieder Macht).3 Precisely this attitude, as Heller immediately recognized in 
his later writings, was extended and radicalized in Heller's own political 
context. The concept of politics had been instrumentalized in conjunction 
with the assumption of the principle of absolute State supremacy, thus 
placing in question any other possible criteria of political existence. 
                                            
2
 See the transcript of the debate between Heller and Schmitt before the 
Staatsgerichtshof in Heller/Schmitt, Preussen contra Reich vor dem 
Staatsgerichtshof, Glashutten im Taunus, Verlag Detlev Auvermann, 1976.  
3
 This sentence, taken from an essay by Treitschke, “Bundesstaat und 
Einheitsstaat,” is subjected to a penetrating analysis by Heller in Hegel und 
der nationale Machtstaatsgedanke in Deutschland, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, 
Tübingen, Mohr, 1992, p.63 f.  
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The work Europe and Fascism pursues and deepens this theory of 
political instrumentalization in terms of Heller's notion of the 
“fictionalization of politics”, which he situates at the heart of fascist 
theories of the State. Heller’s book is the outcome of months of study in 
1928, at first hand, of the Italian fascist political and legal system. Heller 
began his inquiry following the publication of Carl Schmitt's book 
Parliamentarianism and Democracy (Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des 
heutigen Parlamentarismus, 1923/1926), in which Schmitt claimed that 
Italian fascism, and to a lesser extent Soviet Bolshevism, were more 
democratic than the French or English parliamentary systems. Heller’s 
conclusions are quite different: he reports a thoroughgoing lack of 
democracy in Italy in conjunction with a sweeping eradication of the rule of 
law, resulting from what he takes to be an overall crisis of European 
politics of which fascism is the most obvious symptom. His concept of 
fictionalization is set within the framework of these analyses. 
As defined by Heller in Europe and Fascism, political fiction constitutes 
the ultimate expression of political instrumentalization. The 
instrumentalization of values in function either of the quest for political 
takeover or of the maintenance of power disregards all consideration of the 
“truth” or intrinsic worth of these values. The problem of truth is entirely 
subordinated to the quest for power. In this context so typical of politics in 
the twentieth century, a well-constructed fiction or myth capable of 
galvanizing the beliefs of the masses serves as a formidable political tool 
through which “truth” is equated with efficacy, even where what is asserted 
to be true has lost all plausibility. Hermann Heller argues that 
fictionalization as a political instrument, by shifting the focus away from 
the problem of factual plausibility, accounts for the ease by which fiction 
embodied in political myths can be tailored to a wide variety of political 
aims. This applies to Georges Sorel’s idea of “myth” which, once stripped of 
its initial objective of the general strike, played a major ideological role 
among proponents of the extreme right.4 It corresponds to the purely 
strategic and “fictional” role played by religious belief for Charles Maurras,5 
as well as by the “myth of the nation” in the writings of Mussolini. By 
                                            
4
 Regarding the reception of Sorel see Schlomo Sand, L'illusion du politique, 
Paris, Editions de la Découverte, 1985 and Zeev Sternhell, “Georges Sorel, le 
syndicalisme révolutionaire et la droite radicale au début du siècle” in 
J. Julliard, S. Sand, eds., Georges Sorel et son temps, Paris, Le Seuil, 1985. 
5
 Heller quotes Maurras' famous slogan “I am an atheist, but I am Catholic”, 
Gesammelte Schriften, vol. II, p. 488-89. Maurras also wrote “The silence of 
religious thought could not lead me away from the more or less clear, more or 
less high idea, still strong, of profound Catholic goodness.” Charles Maurras, 
L'action française et la religion catholique, Paris, Nouvelles Editions Latines, 
1978, pp.73 f.  
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transforming the content of Sorel's myth, while maintaining its indifference 
to factual reality, or even to plausibility, Maurras, like Mussolini, adapted 
fictionalization to the needs of a particular political agenda. Heller 
considered one telling example to be particularly relevant: Mussolini’s 
statement that it is not at all necessary for the “myth of the nation” as a 
central belief in the fascist ideology, to “correspond to a reality.”6 
It would reach beyond the purpose of the present paper to provide a 
detailed analysis of the role of fiction in the movement towards political 
instrumentalization in the 20th century. Of particular importance for our 
current investigation, however, is to set in relief the role of fiction as a novel 
feature in the formulation of the politics of mass manipulation. Clearly, the 
principle of instrumentalization promoted by such politics is of itself by no 
means new; it is, indeed, as old as political tradition itself. Beginning from 
the assumption that all supposedly fundamental “truth” does nothing more 
than express a given interest or, in the language of the 20th century, a 
hidden “will to power”, instrumentalization traditionally tended to reduce 
all political values to mere weapons in combat. The classic formulation of 
this idea in the 20th century, which attracted Heller's close attention, was 
elaborated by Carl Schmitt in his work The Concept of the Political. In this 
book Schmitt postulated that any values, even what are taken to be 
humanitarian ones, are nothing more than interests that come to concrete 
expression in the definition of the relationship between friend and foe.7 The 
new feature grafted onto this formulation in the context of the 20th century 
is the deliberately fictitious use of myth as the founding principle of the 
ideology of the Machtstaat – nationalism that has become a “religion 
applied to domination of the flock.”8 This is the new feature I seek to 
elucidate on the basis of Hermann Heller’s analyses. 
Heller's investigations clearly illustrate the obligation for political 
philosophy, in light of the problem raised by the “fictionalization of 
politics”, to revise its fundamental categories. Several years before the 
publication of Europa und der Fascismus, this is what prompted Heller, in 
his book Die Souveränität (1927), to initiate a novel reformulation of the 
theoretical foundations of the State based on the rule of law (Rechtsstaat), 
and of democratic pluralism, in reaction to those who sought to reduce 
these fundamental elements to mere weapons among other supposedly 
equally valid weapons in the ideological struggle. In Europa und der 
                                            
6
 Hermann Heller, Europa und der Fascismus, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. II, 
p. 505.  
7
 Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, Berlin, Duncker und Humblodt, 
1963, p.55; Hermann Heller, “Politische Demokratie und soziale Homogenität”, 
Gesammelte Schriften, vol. II, p.423-433. 
8
 Hermann Heller, “Rechtsstaat oder Diktatur?” Gesammelte Schriften, vol. II, 
p.453. 
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Fascismus and in other writings, Heller attempted to recast political 
philosophy in opposition to 20th century forms of pure political 
instrumentalization. This attempt inspires the following theoretical 
argument in my own investigations, which can be introduced here in 
preliminary terms: if philosophical reflection on politics must assume a 
character which differs from that of past traditions, this is because the 
unprecedented propagation in our times of the “fictionalization of politics” 
forces philosophy to engage in a reexamination of the primordial idea of 
truth in politics. And it is precisely this issue which political myths 
threaten to blur when they depreciate the role of factual analysis in the 
domain of the political. This is the hypothesis I will attempt to develop 
through analysis of the orientations of Ernst Cassirer and Karl Löwith. 
 
Ernst Cassirer and the “Political Myth of the Twentieth Century” 
Whereas the theory of the “fictionalization of politics” as myth in the 
writings of Hermann Heller is rooted in his juridico-political standpoint, 
Ernst Cassirer’s interest in myth draws on an anthropological orientation 
grounded in neo-Kantian epistemology. Heller's theory of the 
fictionalization of politics deals with the use of myth made by political 
groups for purposes of mass manipulation. In contrast, Ernst Cassirer’s 
analyses of this same phenomenon is based on a broad anthropology of 
myth formulated over the course of several decades. Cassirer's last book, 
The Myth of the State, which he finished in New York a few months before 
his death in 1945, extends analyses elaborated in his earlier work The 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, published during the twenties, and 
particularly in the second volume of this work entitled Mythical Thought 
(1925). The study of Cassirer's theory of myth may also be supplemented 
by his unpublished manuscripts located in the archives of Yale University.9 
The issue which most directly concerns me in Cassirer’s writings is the 
relationship between the initial theory of myth in Mythical Thought, 
dealing exclusively with myth in ancient or non-western cultures, and the 
later theory of myth described by Cassirer in the Myth of the State, which 
deals primarily with modernity. In this final period of his life, Cassirer 
attempted to understand modern politics – and in particular the radical 
politicization of the Machtstaat typical of the twentieth century – in light of 
his general theory of myth. Beyond the question of the deliberate 
fabrication of myths or a “fictionalization of politics” in Heller’s sense of the 
word, Cassirer acknowledged the specific character of modern myth in 
relation to ancient or non-Western mythmaking, while at the same time 
identifying what he took to be a profound affinity between all forms of 
                                            
9
 Cassirer's unpublished manuscripts can be found in particular at the Beinecke 
Rare Book Library of Yale University.  
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myth, linking ancient and non-Western mythmaking to its expressions in 
modernity. The key feature of Cassirer's theory of myth lies in his attempt 
to account, on the basis of his general theory of myth, for the extraordinary 
efficacy of contemporary political myth. 
Cassirer acknowledged that the “myth of the twentieth century” (an 
expression ostensibly drawn from the title of the book by the Nazi 
ideologist Alfred Rosenberg, Der Mythos des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts) is a 
conscious fabrication designed, through its ability to mystify the masses, to 
serve as a weapon in political combat.10 It is this status as a consciously 
fabricated tool which characterizes the uniqueness of modern myths in 
relation to other forms of mythmaking. Nonetheless, the “myth of the 
twentieth century” remains for Cassirer a myth in the true sense of the 
word since its efficacity derives from a more general anthropological source: 
its archaic foundation in the human imagination and in human emotions. 
Although ancient myths, as Cassirer stipulated in Mythical Thought, 
constitute a potent rudimentary form of religious belief sustained by the 
imagination, the strength of the twentieth century myth also derives from 
its status as quasi-religious belief which the imagination reinforces. For 
this reason, the manipulator who employs political myth in our times is, in 
Cassirer's words, at once “homo magus and homo faber.”11 
On the basis of this affinity linking ancient and modern myths, 
accounting for the particular potency of myth-making as a general form of 
anthropological endeavor, Cassirer launched his sweeping critique of 
contemporary myth-making and of the tendency among certain modern 
philosophical orientations to fuel the recrudescence of myth in support of 
the Machtstaat. This criticism is based upon a profound conviction 
inspiring Cassirer’s work as a whole: his belief that the truth of a doctrine 
is closely linked to its ethical consequences. Cassirer's challenge to modern 
myth – both to the myth of the twentieth century and to earlier modern 
theoretical forerunners --is motivated by the somber ethical consequences of 
political myth in the contemporary world. It is this consideration which 
underlies Cassirer's critical treatment of Hegel and Carlyle, Spengler and 
Heidegger. 
Here my initial query reemerges. If, according to Cassirer, we must 
rethink the foundations of political philosophy in response to the problem 
posed by the “myth of the twentieth century”, what does such a rethinking 
entail? What precisely are the criteria that enable us to identify “truth” in 
politics as a means of defending the political against the enormous potency 
of myth in our contemporary world? 
                                            
10
 Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State, New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1974, p. 282.  
 
11
Ibid., p. 282.  
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Karl Löwith and the “Ideology of Facticity” 
The political thought of Karl Löwith provides a third perspective in 
which to place the theoretical implications of the radical problem of politics 
in the twentieth century. My analysis is based on Löwith's writings of the 
1930s and 1940s, during which he was forced to leave Germany and 
emigrated to Italy, then to Japan and finally to the United States. Recently 
published in his Sämtliche Schriften, these writings include in particular 
“Der okkasionnelle Dezisionimus von Carl Schmitt” (1935) (“The 
Occasional Decisionism of Carl Schmitt”), Der europäische Nihilismus. 
Betrachtungen zur geistigen Vorgeschichte des europäischen Krieges (1940) 
(European Nihilism. Considerations on the Spiritual Antecedents of the 
European War) and Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen (1949/1953) (Meaning 
in History).  
Like Hermann Heller and Ernst Cassirer, Karl Löwith sought both to 
situate the origins of fascism in the intellectual history of Europe and to 
identify its unprecedented character. Where Heller in a legal and political 
perspective, and Cassirer from an epistemological and anthropological 
point of view respectively examined the deliberate fabrication of the “myth 
of the twentieth century”, Löwith focused on the underlying presuppositions 
upon which the apologists of this myth drew, of which they themselves 
were not apparently aware. Hence, without comprehending the 
implications of their efforts, the apologists of Nazism, above all those who 
were well-known intellectuals, participated in a movement rooted in the 
more general intellectual history of Europe. In an early political essay on 
Carl Schmitt’s “occasional decisionism” published in 1935, Löwith was less 
concerned with Schmitt’s praise of “myth” in the work Political 
Romanticism or with the services Schmitt later rendered to the “myth of the 
twentieth century”,12 than with the precise way in which Schmitt, in his 
transformation of the intellectual heritage of the 19th century, distorted the 
notion of truth in politics. As interpreted by Löwith, the idea of “truth” in 
politics became acutely problematic when conceived, in particular by Marx, 
in terms of ideology. Here truth was divested of all possible autonomy: 
referred to its historical context of development, truth can express no more 
than the interest of a class and, as such, is reduced to a function of political 
struggle. Whereas political struggle for Marx engaged a dialectical 
movement leading to the overcoming of the initial terms of struggle, the 
political decisionism of Carl Schmitt appropriated the moment of ideological 
instrumentalization, while divesting it of its dialectical structure. Here the 
claim to “truth” in the arena of human action could be no more than the 
                                            
12
 Karl Löwith, “Der okkasionelle Dezisionismus von Carl Schmitt”, Sämtliche 
Schriften, vol. 8, Heidegger : Denker in dürftiger Zeit, Stuttgart, Metzler, 1984, 
p. 34.  
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expression of a hidden underlying group will. It was thus reduced to an 
ideological weapon in the framework of a given friend/foe relationship.  
This, then, was for Löwith the radical interpretation Schmitt presented 
of truth in politics: far from expressing autonomous and universal values, 
the norms of politics, according to Schmitt's own formulation in Politische 
Theologie (1921), arise “out of nothingness” (aus dem Nichts) – from the 
facticity of brute decision.13 Precisely the radicalism of this deflation of any 
conception of normative truth beyond the pale of the brute facticity of 
decision (which concerns the inherent contingency of the political situation 
rather than faithfulness to facts [Tatsachen] or factual analysis) lies at the 
heart of a political theory positing the supremacy of the opportune. This 
tendency at the same time accounts for the ease with which Schmitt, 
following a period of marked political ambiguity during the Weimar 
Republic and in view of the “facticity” of the new political situation 
following Hitler's rise to power, became a fervent supporter of in the Nazi 
regime. 
It would reach beyond the scope of this paper to present a more 
complete analysis of Löwith's critique of Schmitt, or of the analogous 
“ideology of facticity” which he attributes to the philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger. Since my work is primarily concerned with the reformulation of 
the task of political philosophy in the twentieth century, I will restrict my 
examination to my initial question: given the burdensome legacy of politics 
in the 20th century and its highly problematic character for philosophical 
reflection, what meaning can be accorded to the idea of “truth” in politics? 
Any attempt to respond to this question in the perspective of Löwith's 
investigations involves a complex line of interpretation. Some of Löwith’s 
works, such as the book Der Europäische Nihilismus, written at the outset 
of World War II, convey an image of spiritual confusion in Europe bearing 
little promise for the future. Nevertheless, Löwith’s originality lies in his 
call for a “critique of historical existence” (Kritik der geschichtlichen 
Existenz), which is best described in his cardinal work Weltgeschichte und 
Heilsgeschehen. Written after World War II, Löwith presents in this volume 
his interpretation of the distortions of political modernity leading, in 
particular, to the emergence of the perverse messianism of Italian and 
German fascism. Löwith views fascism as the final outcome of a profound 
mystification, rooted in an ancient legacy of historical reflection, which has 
continually deepened over the course of modern times. Löwith traces this 
mystification to the eschatological interpretation of historical time 
stemming from Christian philosophies of history, from St. Augustine to 
Joachim of Floris and Bossuet. In modern times, Hegel produced a radical 
                                            
13
 Karl Löwith, “Der okkasionelle Dezisionismus von Carl Schmitt”, Sämtliche 
Schriften, p. 45.  
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secularization of Christian eschatology by relegating its development to the 
movement of the Spirit in this world. Hegel thus envisaged the “advent of 
salvation on the level of universal history.”14 The critique of historical 
existence engaged by Löwith attempted to relate the principal modern 
philosophies of history from Hegel to Marx, up to the historicism of Dilthey, 
to the tacit secularization of a tendency originating in the Christian 
tradition: the “fiction” that history has ultimate “meaning.” 
Löwith’s interpretation, which I examine here only in outline, presents a 
major challenge to modern philosophies of history. The primary significance 
of his challenge in light of the problematic status of politics in the twentieth 
century lies in Löwith’s appeal for a clear separation of political existence 
from all forms of philosophy of history propounding the doctrine of 
movement towards an end – a secularized doctrine stemming from the 
Christian philosophies of history.  
Doubtless certain of Löwith's claims regarding the general features of 
modern times are subject to debate. Ernst Bloch, for example, questioned 
Löwith's derivation of Marxist philosophy from the history of secularized 
eschatology.15 Similarly, Hans Blumenberg criticized Löwith's 
interpretation of Enlightenment philosophy of history.16 Nevertheless, in 
my opinion the strength of Karl Löwith's argument lies in the radical 
distinction he draws between political action in the framework of the 
human historical world and secularized eschatological belief in a sense of 
history leading to earthly salvation. 
With this distinction in mind, it is possible to appreciate the significance 
of Löwith's analyses of the distortion of the schema of historical progression 
by those who, after having proclaimed the decline of Western tradition, 
rallied to the perverse messianism of fascism. In this light, the 
philosophies of decline typical of the twentieth century – elaborated, most 
notably by Carl Schmitt or Martin Heidegger – adopted in their own 
manner the idea that history has a “meaning”, albeit one which reverses 
progression in a movement toward decline. Attributing in this manner a 
"meaning" to history, political decision discounts a declining historical 
tradition as a source of normative values and rids itself of inhibitions that 
such a tradition might have imposed. Decision “out of nothingness” 
expresses nothing more clearly than this divestiture of thought of all 
limitations beyond the brute facticity of existence. Nothing further prevents 
                                            
14
 Karl Löwith, Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen. Zur Kritik der 
Geschichtsphilosophie, Sämtliche Schriften, vol. 2, Stuttgart, Metzler, 1983, 
p. 9.  
15
 Ernst Bloch, Erbschaft dieser Zeit (1935), Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 
1985. 
 
16
Hans Blumenberg, Legitimität der Neuzeit, Frankfort am Main, Suhrkamp, 
1983. 
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such authors from an opportune adaptation of decision to the “facticity” of 
the situation presented by the new regime in Germany and to its perverse 
messianism, holding out the promise of secular salvation.17 In the final 
analysis, the ideology of facticity readily lends itself to the radical 
instrumentalization of politics as a function of the Machtstaat. 
 
II. Truth in Politics 
The identification of “fiction”, “myth” or “chimera” through which a 
radical instrumentalization of politics in the 20th century was able to take 
root presupposes the ability to unmask the mystifying feature which this 
fiction, myth or chimera incarnates. What criteria enable us to place such a 
feature in relief?  
A preliminary response to this question may be proposed on the basis of 
the different elements of analysis offered by the theories of Hermann 
Heller, Ernst Cassirer and Karl Löwith. What comes to light generally 
speaking is that the gap between fiction, myth, or chimera and a given 
“factual situation” can only partially account for this mystification. 
Mystification in the full sense of the term insinuates itself into this gap 
through its pretense to homogeneity and hegemonic domination of political 
objectives. This pretense must be subjected to critical unmasking, since it 
contravenes the fundamental pluralism at the basis of a State governed by 
the rule of law, above all in democratic societies (Heller); since it imposes a 
collective will which cannot but infringe upon human freedom (Cassirer); or 
because it passes off illusory beliefs in the redemption of the world, with 
the political fanaticism that this type of belief tends to incite, as certain 
knowledge of the future of human history (Löwith). If there is any 
significance to the notion of “truth” in politics, it is that such fundamental 
political principles limit attempts at political instrumentalization and 
manipulation in human societies in general. 
Be this as it may, in our contemporary Western world the problem of 
politics has shifted. We are no longer directly threatened by an extremism 
which might deviate into total political domination. Since the end of World 
War II, a broad consensus favors democratic government and the rule of 
law, and the present context has witnessed the victory of political 
“liberalism”, granting the individual a large margin of freedom in the face of 
collective demands. Both political messianism (whether murderous or less 
“hardline”) and all-encompassing philosophy of history have widely forfeited 
their credibility. However, has the risk of political instrumentalization 
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 A more extensive analysis of Löwith's argument can be found in my article 
“The Sense of History: on the Political Implications of Karl Löwith's 
Interpretation of Secularization”, op. cit.  
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through myth disappeared as a result of this transformation of European 
politics? 
My current research begins with the hypothesis that the 
instrumentalism of politics – its use as a pure mode of manipulation – 
comes most powerfully to the fore in cases where the boundary between the 
reality of a set of attested facts and imaginary fabrication is blurred, or 
where such fabrication gives way to deliberate falsification as a means of 
manipulating beliefs and opinions. Clearly, as historians acknowledge 
since Croce and Collingwood, there is no exact distinction between the 
reality of historical events and the creative imagination, since the 
reconstruction of reality itself necessarily appeals to imaginative 
reconstitution. Nevertheless, this methodological avowal should not serve 
as an excuse for neglecting the basic difference between the imaginative act 
aimed at the reconstruction of possible ties between facts and a will to 
manipulate which deliberately seeks to replace attested facts by fiction. 
This consideration brings me to the critical perspective I will suggest in 
conclusion. 
This critique challenges the hypothesis that representations of the past, 
on the basis of which political beliefs are formed, are essentially similar to 
literary productions. This widely-accepted hypothesis, or one of its variants, 
was forcefully expressed by Nietzsche in the following highly paradoxical 
statement: 
“Only when historiography tolerates being transformed 
into art, and thus becoming a pure artistic creation, can it 
maintain or perhaps even arouse instincts. Such 
historiography would, however, completely contradict the 
analytic and inartistic traits of our time, for which such 
transformation would represent a falsification.”18 
The broad contemporary reception of this theory generally begins from 
the following presupposition: factual “reality” is so variegated and so 
heterogeneous that, in the final analysis, what is taken to be hard “fact” is 
indeed nothing more than a product of imaginative construction which 
chooses its interpretative perspective amid the infinite range of 
heterogeneous possibilities. As a consequence, the consistency of reality 
dissipates in the face of the assumption that it is no more than the product 
of the imagination; on this basis the most variegated possibilities of 
interpretation are considered to be equally valid.19 Despite the intentions 
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 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben” 
in Werke, vol. 1, Frankfurt am Main, Ullstein, 1980, p. 252. 
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 On this topic see Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse. Essays in Cultural 
Criticism, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1978, Hans Kellner, Language and 
Historical Representation. Getting the Story Crooked, Madison, University of 
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of certain of its proponents, this theory has tended to serve dubious 
political ends. 
Why, however, should political identities rely upon an attempt to 
faithfully reconstitute the “reality” of events rather than upon freely-
imagined, fictive constructions? Why should we restrict the free rein of 
imagination in the constitution of human society, a “freedom” which in the 
fabrication of socio-historical reality – including the fictive reformulation of 
the historical past – finds no more inflexible limit than that encountered by 
technology in the free manipulation of nature? 
It is precisely within the paradoxical framework of the recent past, 
witnessing the conjunction of a vast democratic consensus and an 
unprecedented potential for political manipulation, above all through 
technology and through the media, that a re-reexamination of the thought 
of philosophers such as Hermann Heller, Ernst Cassirer and Karl Löwith 
should prove particularly salutary. When dealing with the problem of 
political radicalization earlier in the 20th century, each of these thinkers 
set in relief the danger presented by a thoroughgoing instrumentalization of 
politics in the guise of fiction, myth or chimera. With the coming of the 21st 
century this danger has by no means disappeared. 
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